Author Archives: dboggs07

Dear David,

Dear David,

You are in the state of CA, therefore, ALL of the documents pertaining to the borrower’s (your) original deed of trust purchase agreement are fraudulent on its face and therefore VOID.  This is true, but very difficult to argue in the court of law due to the fact that if the court negates your contract on this issue, it means that the court contends that every deed of trust contract in CA is VOID.  No court wants to rule on this.  So, it must be argued carefully and precisely and in a way to which a court might rule in your favor.

(This post is In response to a comment and email exchanges to a reader.)

The bank misrepresented and deceived the borrower at the inception of the deed of trust agreement.  The bank substituted a Trustee without your permission, acceptance or knowledge.  This is against the Statue of Frauds (1677) wherein EVERY change in a real estate contract MUST be agreed to and signed by ALL parties involved in the agreement throughout the life of the agreement.  This is BASIC real estate contract law.  The other problem with the substituted change is that the bank did this without your knowledge or consent.  This means that they are able to change the Trustee at their will.  According to SB1638 (1998) the bank is allowed to change the Trustee at their discretion.  This means that the acting Trustee is not allowed to NOT be substituted if they deem so otherwise.  This means that the Trustee is NOT independent, as it was ruled by the CA Supreme Court in 1978 in Garfinkle v Superior Court of Contra Costa County [21 Cal.3d 268}.  The independence of the Trustee is deemed imperative to the non-judicial foreclosure process because the courts have given the Trustee the presumption of correctness.  This means that it is the intention of the non-judicial process that the Trustee act as the court and therein what the Trustee states as true and correct is deemed true and correct.  This is due to the fact that the Trustee is to be independent as based on the Supreme Court’s ruling in 1978.  However, in 1996, the Senate Bill 1638 became enacted law in 1998.  This Bill allowed the banks to substitute the Trustee at the will of the bank.  This means that the Trustee is controlled by the financial institution.  This means that there is no independence of a Trustee at the inception of the Deed of Trust agreement.  This means that if the bank does not inform the borrower of this fact at the inception of the contract agreement then they have deceived the borrower into using a Deed of Trust agreement.  This means that through this misrepresentation by the banks of the material fact that the Trustee is not independent, that the Deed of Trust agreement is in fact fraudulent on its face and therefore VOID.  This means that there was never a legal Deed of Trust contract agreement to begin with.  Let this sink in!!

This means that you acquiesce to a viable contract if you argue ANYTHING outside of these facts.  This is what the opposition wants you to get to.  The fact that there is no contract means that absolutely anything you argue pertaining to the contract brings you to the point of agreeing that there in fact actually was a contract.  This is what they want.

First, they must prove that the original and subsequent substituted trustees in the Deed of Trust agreement are in fact independent and can protect the borrower from ANY wrongdoing by a financial institution or any other party acting on behalf of the financial institution throughout the duration of the deed of trust agreement.  They are incapable of proving this issue.  This is where they do not want to be, because they cannot prove that the Trustee is independent.  If the original and any subsequent Trustee is not independent and can protect either party’s best interest in a deed of trust agreement then there is no deed of trust agreement.  This was the intent of the CA Supreme Court ruling in 1978 that the trustee is entrusted to protect BOTH parties from any wrongdoing to the other party in a deed of trust agreement.

As the Trustee is given the presumption of correctness in all of the their actions in a non-judicial foreclosure procedure in the state of CA, it is assumed that all of the documents and actions by either party that the trustee is entrusted to deem as true and correct are in fact so.  This means that the trustee is entrusted to make sure that the bank follow all of the rules to the deed of trust and the power of sale clause, CA Civil Code 2924 et al, in the state of CA.  If the bank controls the trustee and are allowed to break the rules of the power of sale clause then the trustee is incapable of acting in the best interest of the borrower at any point of the duration of the deed of trust agreement.  This means that the borrower was deceived by the bank in that the bank knew all along that the trustee was not independent and was in fact controlled by the bank since the inception of the deed of trust agreement.  This means that there is legal contract.

If there is no true legal deed of trust contract agreement then the bank lent the borrower money under false pretense and the deed of trust is void and the money borrowed by the borrower is not backed by any real estate agreement.  The money borrowed was in fact borrowed under a different premise to which is not arguable in this specific case and must be decided in a different court.  But, the court herein, MUST rule, based on this premise that the deed of trust is in fact VOID.  Now, since there is not deed of trust contract the borrower is the true owner of the title then there is no claim by the bank to any part of the borrower’s title.  Therefore, the bank must now prove to the court of their standing to foreclose.  If the bank has no legal agreement to any claim to title based on their intended use of a deed of trust contract which is fact deemed void then the bank has no standing for any claim whatsoever to the borrower’s title.  They might have claim to the money that they lent the borrower, but this would be a personal loan or some other instrument, but this is another argument in another court of law and cannot be included in this case.  The borrower is the owner of the property and the money.

Whatever documents a bank or trustee acting on behalf of the bank might show are bogus simply based on the fact that they first must prove that they have standing.  They cannot prove standing in ANY non-judicial foreclosure procedure because they are incapable of proving that the trustee is in fact independent in their position.  Since the CA supreme court stated that this must be the case, and the SB1638 states otherwise, and the banks have acted against the CA supreme court ruling and the courts have allowed the banks to control the trustee using 1638, then the trustee is not independent and therefore, based on CA Supreme Court and the Power of Sale clause (CA Civ Code 2924) the deed of trust is in fact void.  If it is void then the bank has no standing.

Also, this means that since the inception of the deed of trust agreement between the lender and the borrower, ANY monies collected on the basis of this agreement have been collected so illegally.  This means that for every month, and every year that the borrower has paid for the money borrowed based on this agreement have been billed and collected for under false pretense and must be returned to the borrower until the courts can rectify how the bank is able to actually collect on the money that they lent due to the fact that there is no legal binding agreement in place that instructs the borrower appropriately and legally to pay the debt off to the lender.  Since the deed of trust agreement is bogus, the bank has no legal basis to come for any debt to the lent money to the borrower.  They have no legal right to challenge the borrower’s title whatsoever.

I am not an attorney and do not offer any of this information as legal advice.  Any information found herein is not to be construed as legal advice.  Please consult a licensed attorney for any further advice on this issue.  This is simply an explanation of how I proceeded in my case based on the legal information that I collected during my case.  I suggest that you talk to your own attorney or licensed legal counsel prior to acting on any of this information.  This information does not in any way constitute any legal binding agreement between the author or the reader.

I hope that this helps clear things up for you.

Doug Boggs

 

 

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Berman v HSBC, Appeal to Vacate the Order is now open for publication

This groundbreaking Berman v HSBC, Appeal to Vacate the Order is open for publication.  The order was approved for publication on May 3, 2017.  You can download this Appeal here: C081487-1

The question that I always have comes down to this:

How are wrongful, inaccurate, and/or fraudulent documents able to be filled with the County Recorder’s Office by a Trustee on behalf of any financial institution?  Independent studies done in the County Recorder’s Office in San Francisco County have shown that over 90% of every deed of trust loan contains wrong, invalid, inaccurate and/or fraudulent documents.  Thereby tainting each property title filed in the state.  How can this happen?  And it is still happening for every loan, every day since Jan 1, 1998.

In my case against Wells Fargo Bank, the bank falsely used and misrepresented their use of Cal Civ Code 2923.5g in their illegal non-judicial foreclosure procedure against me.  The Civil Code used in this Appeal shown below is the next code in the banks immediate lines of defense for the banks and fraudulent trustees misuse and manipulation of the modification process and their ability to file fraudulent paperwork in a non-judicial foreclosure procedure due to the fact that the Trustee is not independent, as the CA State Supreme Court ruled that they were supposed to be independent and arms length in a Deed of Trust contract.  This ruling from the CA Supreme Court was filed in 1978 from the Garfinkle v Superior Court of Contra Costa County case. However, in 1996 the CA legislature created SB 1638 which redefined how a substitution of trustee is able to take place.  This bill became enacted law in Jan 1998, therein making EVERY deed of trust agreement issued by a financial institution since that date fraudulent on its face and therefore VOID.  When I exposed this in court it was then that the judge removed my case file from public view and dismissed my case on a bogus technicality in order to not have the information become public.

This Appeal Order seen below helps to give strength to the argument that I was using, which anyone can use since that argument is valid with any Deed of Trust agreement written in CA since Jan 1998.  You is a link for you to download a PDF of this Appeal C081487-1

i am currently working with two state Senators to try to re-write and overturn the law that was passed back in 1996 based from SB 1638.  It was that bill that allowed the banks to substitute a trustee at their will rather than having to follow the existing rules of the CA Civil Code.  Due to this it negated the validity of the independence of the Trustee.  Therefore, without the independence of the trustee in a deed of trust agreement, there is no valid deed of trust agreement as it is outlined in the Power of Sale clause and CA Civil Code 2924, et al.  The lack of independence defies the rules of the deed of trust and allows fraudulent paperwork to be filed and no oversight to any wrongdoing by a financial institution or a trustee in a non-judicial foreclosure procedure.  Therein, this allows any bank or fraudulent trustee to illegally foreclose on anyone, anytime, anywhere without reason or validity to any paperwork.

In a deed of trust agreement there is instituted a trustee to act as the courts thereby bypassing a standard foreclosure procedure in the court system.  The non-judicial foreclosure process was designed to help alleviate the burden to the court system over the standard mortgage foreclosure process.  Since the trustee is taxed with acting on behalf of the court it was designed and substantiated in the [Garfinkle v Superior Court of Contra Costa County] Supreme Court ruling that the trustee was to be independent due to the fact that they represent the court and are given the presumption of correctness in their actions due to the fact that they are to be independent and arms length throughout the life of the deed of trust contract.

When the bank lobbyists wrote the SB 1638 in 1996 it was to quietly strip the independence away from the trustee therein setting the stage for any deed of trust to be able to be foreclosed on whether someone was current on their payments or not.  In fact, this allowed someone who paid cash for their property and had never even entered into a loan agreement to be foreclosed on.  Based on the fact that the trustee is fraudulent and owned, controlled and manipulated by the banks or fraudulent law firms they are able to file fraudulent paper and submit this paper to the County Recorder’s Office with no oversight as to any legitimacy to the validity of any information contained in the papers being filed.  This fraud against the court has been going on with EVERY document being filed for a deed of trust agreement and for ANY and EVERY non-judicial foreclosure procedure in the state of CA since Jan 1, 1998.

Let that sink in for a moment.  Oh, also note that there are 36 deed of trust states in the United States.  you can do the math…

I look forward to seeing how this new ruling will be able to help substantiate and moreover help to solidify the argument that I brought forward to the courts, but due to the corruption of the judge, was subsequently silenced.

 

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(The following Appeal has just been released for publication as of May 3, 2017)

STANLEY P. BERMAN, Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
HSBC BANK USA, N.A., Defendant and Respondent.

No. C091497
Court of Appeals of California, Third District, Nevada.
Filed April 11, 2017.
Appeal from the Superior Court No. CU14080886.

When defendant HSBC Bank USA, N.A. (HSBC) notified plaintiff Stanley P. Berman in writing that HSBC was denying his application for a loan modification, HSBC told him he had 15 days to appeal the denial. Under the law, however, Berman actually had 30 days to appeal. (See Civ. Code,[1] § 2923.6, subd. (d) [“[i]f the borrower’s application for a first lien loan modification is denied, the borrower shall have at least 30 days from the date of the written denial to appeal the denial”].)

Berman brought this action for injunctive relief under section 2924.12 on the theory that “the denial letter . . . [wa]s a material violation of sub[division] (d) [of section 2923.6] in that [the letter] only provide[d] fifteen days for appeal.” The trial court sustained HSBC’s demurrer to Berman’s complaint without leave to amend based on the conclusion that Berman had not alleged a violation of section 2923.6. On Berman’s appeal, we conclude the trial court erred: the denial letter constituted a material violation of section 2923.6 because it substantially misstated the time Berman was allowed by the law to appeal HSBC’s denial of his application for a loan modification. Moreover, we find no merit in any of HSBC’s alternate arguments for affirming the trial court. Accordingly, we will reverse.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Because this appeal arises from the sustaining of a demurrer, we summarize the facts alleged in the complaint, accepting as true the properly pleaded factual allegations. (See Debrunner v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 433, 435.)

Berman is the record owner of the property located at 15342 Carrie Drive, Grass Valley, California, where he resides. Berman defaulted on his home mortgage and a notice of default was recorded. Sometime prior to September 16, 2014, Berman submitted a complete application for a loan modification to HSBC, asserting a significant change in financial condition. By letter dated September 18, 2014, HSBC denied Berman’s request for a loan modification. HSBC’s denial letter stated that Berman had until October 2, 2014, (i.e., 15 days) to file an appeal of the decision.[2]

On December 2, 2014, Berman commenced this action against HSBC by filing a complaint seeking injunctive relief. In his complaint, he asserted that because HSBC’s denial letter gave him only 15 days to appeal the denial, when section 2923.6, subdivision (d) provides for an appeal period of at least 30 days, the denial letter was “in violation of sub[division] (d) in that it only provides fifteen days for appeal [and] thus the requirements of sub[division] (f) describing the matter mandated to be included in the denial letter have not be[en] followed and the trustee sale can not [sic] legally proceed.”[3] He further asserted that “[n]o significant injury to Defendants will occur through the granting of the injunction as all they would need to do is issue an amended denial letter which complies with the 30 day appeal requirement and then they would be legally entitled to conduct a trustee’s sale once that period had expired.” Thus, it was apparent that Berman was seeking injunctive relief that would require HSBC to issue a new denial letter before HSBC could proceed to notice and conduct a trustee’s sale.

The day after he filed his initial complaint, Berman filed a first amended verified complaint. The only difference between the two complaints was that the amended complaint was verified.

In July 2015, HSBC demurred to the first amended complaint, arguing (among other things) that “[s]ection 2923.6 only prohibits the recording of a notice of default or notice of sale, or conducting a sale, unless certain requirements are met,” and HSBC “did[] not actually conduct[] the sale within [the appeal] period. In fact, to date, the sale has not occurred in the six months after the September 18, 2014 Denial Letter.” The trial court sustained the demurrer with leave to amend, reasoning that “no violation of [subdivision (e) of section 2923.6 wa]s alleged” because Berman did not allege that HSBC “recorded a Notice of Sale or conducted a trustee’s sale prior to 31 days after [he] was notified in writing of the denial of the modification.”[4]

On August 31, 2015, Berman filed a second amended complaint. The factual allegations in this complaint are similar in all relevant respects to the allegations in the first amended complaint (and the original complaint). In the second amended complaint, however, Berman asserted for the first time that “the denial letter . . . is a material violation of subdivision (d) in that it only provides fifteen days for appeal.” Berman further asserted that he was entitled to an injunction under section 2924.12 enjoining HSBC from conducting a trustee’s sale until the court determined that the violation was corrected.[5]

HSBC demurred to the second amended complaint, again asserting that it had not violated section 2923.6 because it had not conducted a trustee’s sale within the statutory appeal period. The trial court agreed and sustained the demurrer without leave to amend because again Berman did not allege that HSBC “recorded a Notice of Sale or conducted a trustee’s sale prior to 31 days after [he] was notified in writing of the denial of the modification.” With respect to Berman’s reference to section 2924.12, the court noted that “that provision allows for injunctive relief if there is a material violation of another provision” and “[h]ere, Plaintiff has not demonstrated a violation of another provision.” The trial court subsequently entered judgment in favor of HSBC.

Berman timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) We review the complaint to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action. (Ibid.) For purposes of review, we accept as true all material facts alleged in the complaint, but not the contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law. (Ibid.)

Oddly enough — given that he acknowledges the issue for us to decide is whether the complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action — in the page and one-half he devotes to argument in his opening brief, Berman does not address that issue at all. Instead, he argues that HSBC “never raised the issue of materiality in its demurrer, materiality was never briefed by the parties, yet the Court’s ruling was based on its sua sponte consideration of the issue of materiality.” He contends this was “clear error and grounds for reversal.” He further asserts that he alleged materiality in his complaint when he alleged that the denial letter was a material violation of subsection (d) of section 2923.6.

Not only does Berman’s argument fail to address the only issue that really matters — whether his complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action — his argument is based on an entirely erroneous premise — namely, that the trial court’s sustaining of HSBC’s demurrer “was based on its sua sponte consideration of the issue of materiality.” That is simply not the case. It is true the trial court noted that in his second amended complaint, Berman sought injunctive relief under section 2924.12, which allows for injunctive relief if there is a “material violation” of any of various statutes, including section 2923.6, but the conclusion the trial court drew relative to section 2924.12 was only that Berman had “not demonstrated a violation” of any of the statutes referenced in section 2924.12. Thus, the trial court was not concerned with and did not consider “materiality” and the trial court’s ruling sustaining HSBC’s demurrer was in no way “based” on any “consideration of the issue of materiality,” sua sponte or otherwise. Rather, the trial court’s ruling was based on its conclusion that Berman had not alleged any violation of section 2923.6.

As to that issue — whether Berman’s second amended complaint alleged facts constituting a violation of section 2923.6 and thus facts sufficient to state a cause of action for injunctive relief under section 2924.12 — Berman’s opening brief offers no argument. This omission would be sufficient for us to affirm the judgment against Berman because “[i]t is the appellant’s burden to demonstrate the existence of reversible error” (Del Real v. City of Riverside (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 761, 766), and “`”[w]hen an appellant fails to raise a point, . . . we treat the point as waived.”‘ [Citation.] `We are not bound to develop [an] appellant[‘s] argument for [him]. [Citation.] The absence of cogent legal argument or citation to authority allows this court to treat the contention as waived’” (Cahill v. San Diego Gas & Electrical Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 939, 956). Nevertheless, despite Berman’s failure to address in his opening brief the dispositive issue of whether his second amended complaint alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of action, we will not treat that issue as waived because, between the parties’ arguments in the trial court, and the arguments exchanged between HSBC’s respondent’s brief and Berman’s reply brief, the dispositive issue here has been adequately addressed by both sides and is sufficiently framed and developed for us to decide.

Essentially, the competing positions are as follows:

Berman claims that by sending a denial letter that purported to give him only 15 days to file an appeal, HSBC committed a material violation of section 2923.6 because subdivision (f) of that section provides that such a denial letter must include “[t]he amount of time from the date of the denial letter in which the borrower may request an appeal” and subdivision (d) of that section specifies that “the borrower shall have at least 30 days from the date of the written denial to appeal the denial.” Berman essentially reasons that if a denial letter identifies as “[t]he amount of time from the date of the denial letter in which the borrower may request an appeal” a period of time that is less than the 30-day minimum the law requires, the denial letter violates section 2923.6 and is “ineffective,” and an injunction can issue under section 2924.12 to enjoin any trustee’s sale until that violation is corrected by the issuance of a new denial letter that sets forth a legally adequate period for appeal. Berman further contends that he “is under no obligation to file his Notice of Appeal to the denial of the loan modification until [HSBC] has provided a denial letter that fully complies in all material aspects with the mandates of” section 2923.6, because (due to the fact that the initial denial letter was “ineffective”) “[t]he mandated thirty day appeal period has not yet begun running and [HSBC] remains in control as to when that thirty day period will begin running.”

For its part, HSBC takes the position that it did not violate subdivision (f) of section 2923.6 because that subdivision requires only that the denial letter include “[t]he amount of time from the date of the denial letter in which the borrower may request an appeal,” and the denial letter here did so — even if the amount of time specified in the letter was less than the minimum amount of time allowed by subdivision (d) of section 2923.6. HSBC further argues that it did not violate section 2923.6 because it did not conduct a trustee’s sale within the 30-day appeal period provided by subdivision (d), which is prohibited by both subdivision (c) of the statute — which applies while a “complete first lien loan modification application is pending”[6] — and subdivision (e) of the statute — which applies once “the borrower’s application for a first lien loan modification is denied.”[7] And as for the minimum 30-day appeal period provided by subdivision (d) of section 2923.6, HSBC asserts only that: (1) the 15-day period included in its denial letter was “within the statutory appeal period”; and (2) Berman did not appeal in the 30-day statutory period in any event, or even within all of the time that has passed since the September 2014 denial letter (now more than two and one-half years).

We conclude Berman has the better argument. It is without dispute that section 2923.6 does two things that are relevant here: (1) it requires a lender like HSBC to advise the borrower in the denial letter how much time the borrower has to appeal; and (2) it requires the lender to give the borrower at least 30 days to appeal. Thus, to comply with the law, the denial letter must inform the borrower of an appeal period that is at least 30 days in length. HSBC’s denial letter did not do that. Instead, HSBC’s letter advised Berman he had only 15 days to appeal — merely half of the period allowed by law. Because the denial letter did not give Berman the full amount of time to appeal provided by the Legislature, his right to do so was effectively diminished as a result. We conclude this was a material violation of section 2923.6.

To the extent HSBC argues that Berman did not allege a violation of section 2923.6 because Berman did not allege that HSBC conducted a trustee’s sale within the 30-day appeal period provided by subdivision (d), that argument establishes only that Berman did not allege a violation of subdivisions (c) or (e) of section 2923.6. But there is more to the statute than those two subdivisions, and when subdivisions (d) and (f) are considered, it is apparent (as we have concluded) that Berman did allege a violation of section 2923.6.

To the extent HSBC asserts the 15-day appeal period included in its denial letter was “within the statutory appeal period,” that assertion is nonsensical. Subdivision (d) of section 2923.6 requires an appeal period of “at least” 30 days. That means 30 days or more. Thus, an appeal period of only 15 days is not within the statutory appeal period.

To the extent HSBC contends Berman did not appeal within the 30-day statutory period in any event, or even in all of the time that has passed since the September 2014 denial letter (now more than two and one-half years), and thus “has not been prejudiced in any manner,” that contention does not carry the day either. We have concluded already that a denial letter that purports to give a borrower only 15 days to appeal the denial is a material violation of section 2923.6. Subdivision (a) of section 2924.12 provides that “[i]f a trustee’s deed upon sale has not been recorded, a borrower may bring an action for injunctive relief to enjoin a material violation of Section . . . 2923.6” and “[a]ny injunction shall remain in place and any trustee’s sale shall be enjoined until the court determines that the mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent has corrected and remedied the violation or violations giving rise to the action for injunctive relief.” Thus, it does not matter, for purposes of Berman’s request for injunctive relief under section 2924.12, that he has not yet filed an appeal from the September 2014 denial of his application for a loan modification. If Berman proves up the allegations in his second amended complaint, then the denial letter was a material violation of section 2923.6, and section 2924.12 will give Berman the right to an injunction against a trustee’s sale that will remain in place until the court determines that HSBC has corrected and remedied the violation — which HSBC can do by issuing an amended denial letter that properly notifies Berman that he has a period of no less than 30 days to appeal the denial.[8] Nothing in the statutory scheme denies Berman the right to this relief because he did not file an appeal sooner, before the issuance of the amended denial letter. Thus, his failure to file an appeal is, at least for now, of no moment.

Turning to HSBC’s remaining arguments in support of affirming the trial court’s judgment, we find no merit in any of them. HSBC first contends that because Berman’s order to show cause for a preliminary injunction was denied and the previously issued temporary restraining order was dissolved in May 2015, Berman “was already formally denied the only relief he even could have obtained in this matter.” This argument lacks merit for several reasons. First, HSBC fails to point out that the denial of the order to show cause for a preliminary injunction was without prejudice. Second, HSBC fails to point out that the denial was without prejudice because there was no proof of service of the temporary restraining order or the order to show cause as required by the temporary restraining order itself. Third, HSBC fails to provide any authority for the suggestion that the denial of a preliminary injunction on whatever grounds precludes Berman from seeking a permanent injunction. Thus, HSBC has altogether failed to show that the denial of preliminary injunctive relief has any bearing on the merits of Berman’s complaint.

HSBC next contends that Berman’s complaint “fails as it is based on a purportedly defective denial letter in regards to a loan modification.” In HSBC’s view, because the statutory scheme did not guarantee Berman a modification of his loan (see § 2923.4, subd. (a) [“Nothing in the act that added this section . . . shall be interpreted to require a particular result of [the loan modification] process”]), he “cannot allege any harm, or subsequent violation of statute, for having his modification application denied.” This argument also lacks merit. Berman’s complaint does not allege harm from the denial of his application for a loan modification, nor is there any reason for it to. All he is seeking is the injunctive relief section 2924.12 allows to correct a material violation of section 2923.6. His right to such relief is not dependent on whether he is ultimately entitled to a loan modification. While he has no right to a modification, he does have a right to appeal the denial and the 15-day letter effectively cut off that right prematurely. Thus, the fact that he has no statutory right to a modification is entirely irrelevant here.

HSBC next contends Berman’s complaint lacks merit because “by his own concession . . . he was previously offered a . . . loan modification, which he failed to complete.” According to HSBC, the third page of the denial letter, which Berman attached as an exhibit to his first amended complaint, “states on its face . . . that he was denied for a . . . modification because [he] `did not successfully complete a previous Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) offer.’” HSBC argues that under subdivision (g) of section 2923.6, it was not obligated to evaluate Berman’s loan modification application because of his failure to complete the previous HAMP offer. HSBC also contends that subdivision (c) of section 2923.6 precludes the recording of a notice of default or notice of sale or conduct of a trustee’s sale only until the borrower defaults on or otherwise breaches his or her obligations under a loan modification.

Again, HSBC’s arguments are without merit. Subdivision (c) of section 2923.6 is not at issue here. Even assuming that Berman failed to complete a previous modification offer, that has no bearing on whether he is entitled to injunctive relief because HSBC’s failure to provide the full 30-day period to appeal the denial of a subsequent offer was a material violation of subdivisions (d) and (f) of that statute. As for HSBC’s reliance on subdivision (g) of section 2923.6, there are two problems. First, HSBC fails to explain how the fact that it may not have been obligated to evaluate Berman for a second loan modification excuses its material violation of the statute when it nonetheless decided to evaluate him for a second modification. Second, and more important, HSBC fails to explain why, on review of HSBC’s demurrer, we must accept as true a statement of purported fact contained in the denial letter that Berman attached to his complaint. Berman did not attach the letter to his complaint as proof of that purported fact (i.e., that he failed to complete a previous modification offer); he attached it to evidence HSBC’s unlawful provision of only a 15-day appeal period. In the absence of any authority from HSBC that we are bound to treat as true an assertion of fact that Berman did not allege in his complaint, just because that assertion was made in an exhibit Berman appended to his complaint for another reason altogether, we must reject HSBC’s argument based on that factual assertion.

Finally, HSBC contends that Berman has “concede[d] that this meritless action is nothing more than a delay tactic.” By this, HSBC appears to be referring to the fact that Berman is pursuing this action to force HSBC to issue an amended denial letter, and the suggestion that Berman may not even intend to take an appeal from the denial letter after all. Be that as it may, it has no bearing on Berman’s right to relief. As we have explained, section 2924.12 provides for an injunction to stop a trustee’s sale until the court has determined that a material violation of section 2923.6 has been corrected. Any delay in HSBC’s ability to sell Berman’s property at such a sale is the result of the relief the statute provides, HSBC’s failure to acknowledge its error in purporting to give Berman only 15 days to appeal the denial of his application for a loan modification, and HSBC’s stubborn refusal to correct that error in the intervening two and one-half years. In the end, what matters for our purposes is that Berman’s second amended complaint alleged facts sufficient to state a cause of action for injunctive relief. Thus, we must conclude that the trial court erred in sustaining HSBC’s demurrer.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded to the trial court with instructions to vacate its order sustaining HSBC’s demurrer and to enter a new and different order denying the demurrer. Berman shall recover his costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1).)

Murray, J. and Hoch, J., concurs.

[1] All further section references are to the Civil Code.

[2] The letter stated in pertinent part as follows: “You have the right to appeal our decline decision regarding the Homeowners Assistance Program. If you would like to appeal, you must contact us in writing at the address provided below by 10/02/2014 and state that you are requesting an appeal of our decision. . . . You may also specify the reasons for your appeal, and provide any supporting documentation. Your right to appeal expires 10/02/2014. Any appeal requests or documentation received after 10/02/2014 may not be considered.”

[3] As relevant here, subdivision (f)(1) of section 2923.6 provides that “[f]ollowing the denial of a first lien loan modification application, the mortgage servicer shall send a written notice to the borrower identifying the reasons for denial, including the following: [¶] (1) The amount of time from the date of the denial letter in which the borrower may request an appeal of the denial of the first lien loan modification and instructions regarding how to appeal the denial.”

[4] Subdivision (e) of section 2923.6 provides as follows: “If the borrower’s application for a first lien loan modification is denied, the mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall not record a notice of default or, if a notice of default has already been recorded, record a notice of sale or conduct a trustee’s sale until the later of: [¶] (1) Thirty-one days after the borrower is notified in writing of the denial. [¶] (2) If the borrower appeals the denial pursuant to subdivision (d), the later of 15 days after the denial of the appeal or 14 days after a first lien loan modification is offered after appeal but declined by the borrower, or, if a first lien loan modification is offered and accepted after appeal, the date on which the borrower fails to timely submit the first payment or otherwise breaches the terms of the offer.”

[5] As relevant here, subdivision (a) of section 2924.12 provides as follows: “(a)(1) If a trustee’s deed upon sale has not been recorded, a borrower may bring an action for injunctive relief to enjoin a material violation of Section . . . 2923.6. [¶] (2) Any injunction shall remain in place and any trustee’s sale shall be enjoined until the court determines that the mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent has corrected and remedied the violation or violations giving rise to the action for injunctive relief. An enjoined entity may move to dissolve an injunction based on a showing that the material violation has been corrected and remedied.”

[6] As relevant here, subdivision (c) of section 2923.6 provides as follows: “If a borrower submits a complete application for a first lien loan modification offered by, or through, the borrower’s mortgage servicer, a mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall not record a notice of default or notice of sale, or conduct a trustee’s sale, while the complete first lien loan modification application is pending. A mortgage servicer, mortgagee, trustee, beneficiary, or authorized agent shall not record a notice of default or notice of sale or conduct a trustee’s sale until any of the following occurs: [¶] (1) The mortgage servicer makes a written determination that the borrower is not eligible for a first lien loan modification, and any appeal period pursuant to subdivision (d) has expired.”

[7] See footnote 4, ante, for the text of subdivision (e) of section 2923.6.

[8] Indeed, we note, there appears to be no reason why HSBC could not have issued such an amended letter at any time in the last two and one-half years and thus brought an end to the present action.

Here is a link for you to download a PDF of the Appeal – C081487-1

 

 

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I welcome those reading my story. I appreciate all of the emails I have been receiving. I also appreciate those who have registered and subscribe to this blog. If you have come from Facebook please comment on this site, rather than any Facebook post of this page due to the fact that there are many readers who are not part of Facebook forums, or even Facebook itself. I encourage all readers to put their comments on this site so that all of the information will be accessible to all readers from all parts of the internet. I urge you to join this site and receive the RSS feed, or bookmarking us, sharing us with your friends on Facebook and Twitter. If you know of anyone who might benefit from this information I urge you to pass on this website address! Share and let’s make some change together!

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Your Cup Runneth over

Your Cup Runneth Over

WHY SOME PEOPLE HAVE IT ALL

How many times have you met people who seem to have “it all” and yet, all they do is complain about how bad they have it? Then there are others who in spite of having to cope with unusually difficult challenges see themselves as fortunate and even blessed. I think this goes further than simply letting a smile be your umbrella. Rather it’s the deeper perspective they hold for themselves and the world around them that colors every event and interaction of their daily lives. For those who see the glass as half-full, the voice is a friendly one. However, wouldn’t it be great if those who live in a world of half-empty glasses could change their perspective to bring more joy and satisfaction to their lives?

HEARING THE VOICE IN YOUR HEAD

All of us have constant and highly dictatorial voices in our heads that we are so used to hearing that we believe them to be real and wise. This voice is very much in control of many of your actions, much of what you think, what you will and won’t say. The inner voice constantly frets about the future… it chatters away about its worries concerning life, people and how things will go. And it seems to us that the voice is just being smart by warning of danger and by being protective from all of the bad people and events in the world or is being smartly speculative… we think it’s completely rational, understanding, even brilliant, especially in a world filled with terrorism, natural disasters and economic uncertainty.

WHAT YOU SAY IS WHAT YOU GET

The problem is that the explanations that our inner voices provide about events in the past and predictions for the future leave us stuck with low expectations and a sense of resignation. This voice’s confident assessment of future reality may thus lead you to lock yourself into patterns of behaviors in small ways and large ones. For example, you might refuse to go out to dinner with your spouse because “we always argue when we go out to dinner” or “we never have anything to talk about so it’s not fun.” Another possibility is that you may live with chronic, low-level melancholia because your life never seems to work out the way you would like.

Your voice is really telling you the story of your life — the reason it is the way it is, why you are the way you are, and who you can blame.” Listen carefully, to hear how it drones on in a constant state of sameness and how its themes become the themes of your life. By listening to and following the guidelines of these inner voices, people get exactly what they expect from their lives — dissatisfaction. But no one really wants to be unhappy in life,we’d all prefer to be happy and fulfilled.

THOUGHTS CAN BE CHANGED

The good news is thoughts can be changed. They can be denied, laughed at and even eliminated — and you can bring your inner voice in line to harmonize with what you want for your life. You must learn to understand what it is saying and how that affects what you do… what you believe… and who you are.

The point is you are not your inner voice. You are a person who actually has a choice whether or not to listen to your inner voice. Your voice may tell you “you’ll never do that”… or “you can’t succeed”… when you’re considering a new job. Or, it may make excuses that sound more like “I don’t have time,” “I can’t take a class that’s so far away” or “my spouse would never let me spend money on that.” Beneath those excuses, however, is the real message: “I’m scared to ask for what I want and go for it.” The voice may seem like it is keeping you safe, helping you avoid rejection or keeping you from getting hurt… but it is really just holding you back.

With such discouragement coming at you all day, is it any wonder you can’t muster a productive attitude and therefore end up perceiving your life as lacking? Be aware that wherever in your life you lack satisfaction, the voice is probably running rampant. Its many versions keep you the innocent victim with a no-fault policy. This, however, is exactly what stops you from believing in yourself. Regardless of how much you have, there is always what you still want. If you’re not moving toward getting there, you may well be listening to your own drama or resignation that explains why you can’t.

CHANGING THE MESSAGE

And so the first step in revising the messages is to discover exactly what they contain. Here’s how to do that: For a week or two or maybe even a month, keep a “thought log” detailing the comments you make in your head. This teaches you to hear how your voice talks to you — about you, about others, about your body and the events of your day. Get to know this voice and really hear the dialogue that plays endlessly in your head. List the excuses (“no time” or “no money,” for instance). The point is to become so present to your themes that at last you can see where you have been dwelling. What you discover doesn’t have to make sense initially, but if you approach this exercise with humor you can enjoy discovering your hidden influences. This practice begins to separate you from your inner voice.

The next step is to identify your themes. Give them nicknames — are you a sourpuss, always looking to the bleak side? A know-it-all martyr, endlessly doing for others and never for yourself? Perhaps you are a mean saint or a better-than-everyone-else Goodie Two Shoes. Probably your voice has several themes and this is your opportunity to discover them all.

A NEW VOICE

The most challenging task follows — putting into practice the commitment to changing your thoughts. Having exposed them and interpreted their themes and messages, the odds are that you’ve realized these are not the themes you want to be living with. By taking charge of your thoughts you can take charge of your life.

Make rules that help you accomplish this. For instance, you might make a rule that you don’t allow yourself to make snide remarks to yourself about people you see on the street. Another one: Your internal voice is not allowed to tell you that life is short-changing you… and it is never, ever to announce negative conclusions about anything you are facing. To be effective, these rules demand vigilance, diligence and discipline — otherwise your life will slip back to being what it was.

LEARNING TO LAUGH AT YOURSELF IS A MAJOR STEP

No doubt you will find that much of what your voice says concerns others in your life, since your inner voice is practiced at coming to conclusions about what others think, including about you. Your inner voice is really a lot like a bad journalist — reporting what it decides is true without bothering to check the facts. Challenge yourself to do the research by asking the other person or people for their input about what troubles you. It calls for personal courage, but it can be done with honor and respect. When you “hear” such a fear or concern three times, ask questions. Start by saying something like, I’m saying this stuff to myself and I think you could clarify it for me… since it is about you and I want to know if I am nuts or not.

When walking down the street, remind yourself to love people, not pick on them. Assigns light consequences to yourself if you starts to fret, replacing worries with positive thoughts. “This is the most important work you can do. “It’s like building the muscle of the mind. If your thoughts run you and you don’t manage them it is a bit like allowing your child to watch television all the time. We know how that turns out — inconsistent and most likely unhealthy.”

Once you introduce yourself to the storyteller inside your head, you can start working at last on the life and relationships your true self has long hoped to have. With effort, your cup may indeed begin to run over.

 

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I welcome those reading my story. I appreciate all of the emails I have been receiving. I also appreciate those who have registered and subscribe to this blog. If you have come from Facebook please comment on this site, rather than any Facebook post of this page due to the fact that there are many readers who are not part of Facebook forums, or even Facebook itself. I encourage all readers to put their comments on this site so that all of the information will be accessible to all readers from all parts of the internet. I urge you to join this site and receive the RSS feed, or bookmarking us, sharing us with your friends on Facebook and Twitter. If you know of anyone who might benefit from this information I urge you to pass on this website address! Share and let’s make some change together!

Thank you for stopping by.

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©2014-2017 Doug Boggs All Rights Reserved

It’s actually all quite simple, but so corrupt

Once you see behind the proverbial curtain you will find that “it’s actually all quite simple, but so corrupt.”  Why do we call it a justice system, when the justice is gone?  Why do we call it a Trustee when it is in fact a strawman?  Why do we call it a Deed of Trust, when there is no trust involved?  Why do we call it a Non-judicial foreclosure procedure, when the courts are partisan to the fraud?  Perhaps it is called Non-judicial because you will never find true justice.

 

It all comes down to this: “The banks are incapable of proving that the Trustee is in fact independent in the Deed of Trust contract which the bank used as the instrument as means to attach the home as collateral against the mortgage.  The bank is incapable of proving that the Trustee has the power to protect the homeowner from any wrongdoing by the bank during the life of the Deed of Trust contract as described by the need for the Trustee to be recognized as an independent party to the Deed of Trust transaction.  If the banks are unable to prove of the independence of the Trustee in a Deed of Trust agreement then they are in fact committing fraud when using a Deed of Trust agreement when they do not inform the borrower of the fact that the Trustee is not independent and is incapable of looking out in the best interests of the borrower in the Deed of Trust.  If the bank uses a Deed of Trust agreement, knowing that the Trustee is not independent as described by the CA Supreme Court in 1978; Garfinkle v Superior Court of Contra Costa County, they are in fact committing fraud against the borrower at the inception of the contract which makes the contract in fact VOID.”

 

Because the bank knows that they are in control of the Trustee in a non-judicial foreclosure action they are able to in fact foreclose on anyone, anytime, anywhere whether they have a mortgage or even paid cash for their property.   Because the banks know that they own the power to replace the Trustee at any time for any reason they see fit they know that if they wish to file fraudulent paperwork to the County Recorder’s Office in a non-judicial foreclosure.  Because there is no party looking out for the interest of the property owner and the courts have handed over the justice system to the Trustee in a Non-Judicial foreclosure action.  Because the courts have entrusted the Trustee, and the CA  Supreme Court has ruled that the Trustee is to be independent in a Deed of Trust agreement they have given the judicial power of correctness to all of the documents that are filed into the court in a non-judicial foreclosure procedure.
The reason the bank or other party is able to file whatever paperwork they choose in order to foreclose on someone is due to a 1998 rule that changed the rules to the Power of Sale clause.  This rule comes from the 1996 Senate bill 1638:

SB 1638, Johnson. Deeds of trust: trustee substitution. Existing law sets forth the procedures for the substitution of trustees under a deed of trust upon real property or an estate for years therein. This bill would, as an alternative procedure, set forth the procedures for the substitution of trustees under a deed of trust upon real property or an estate for years, given to secure an obligation to pay money, by the beneficiary or beneficiaries under the trust deed who hold more than 50% of the record beneficial interest of a series of notes secured by the same real property or of undivided interests in a note secured by real property equivalent to a series transaction. The bill would also establish a process through which all of the beneficiaries under a trust deed can agree to be governed by beneficiaries holding more than 50% of the record beneficial interest of a series of notes in real property or interests in a note equivalent to a series transaction, as specified. In order to substitute trustees or agree to be governed by the majority interest holders, all parties to the transaction would be required to sign and record a document containing specified information.

This rule gave the bank to power to substitute a new trustee at the will of the bank thereby destroying any semblance of law to the Power Of Sale clause or CA Civ Code 2924 therein making any Deed of Trust agreement fraudulent on its face and therefore void.  Which makes EVERY Deed of Trust agreement since Jan 1, 1998 in fact VOID.

 

We will go over the true repercussions of this next.

 

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I welcome those reading my story. I appreciate all of the emails I have been receiving. I also appreciate those who have registered and subscribe to this blog. If you have come from Facebook please comment on this site, rather than any Facebook post of this page due to the fact that there are many readers who are not part of Facebook forums, or even Facebook itself. I encourage all readers to put their comments on this site so that all of the information will be accessible to all readers from all parts of the internet. I urge you to join this site and receive the RSS feed, or bookmarking us, sharing us with your friends on Facebook and Twitter. If you know of anyone who might benefit from this information I urge you to pass on this website address! Share and let’s make some change together!

Thank you for stopping by.

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©2014-2017 Doug Boggs All Rights Reserved

HSBC v Buset decision

Someone recently called the HSBC v Buset decision to my attention. This decision came out almost a year ago, but I think it’s good to have a reminder. I was going to write my own analysis but then I came across the following. It basically hits on most of the points I would have made anyway.

Now it needs to be said – this decision doesn’t even appear in the regular section I would normally pull decisions from. That tells me this is not a precedential decision. I think the analysis the Judge provides is the most important part. His analysis can be used to formulate these same arguments.

If anyone needs to know the note is not negotiable argument, I have it nearly verbatim to what they judge has in this decision. I’ve seen the argument before and have it written.

The definition of Note Holder in the Note is not the same as the one in the UCC. The Judge addresses that in this decision as well.

 

Okay, here’s an analysis of the decision:

Posted on May 25, 2016 by attorney Susan Lacava

(Originally published on AFN – Anti-Foreclosure Network)

This decision from a trial court in Miami addresses hot topics in foreclosure defense:

  1. assignment of a mortgage by a defunct company;
  2. failure to transfer the loan to the depositor during the securitization;
  3. the subsequent loan servicer hearsay problem;
  4. and the negotiability of the note.

ASSIGNOR OUT OF BUSINESS
The original lender was Freemont Investment and Loan. MERS held the mortgage as nominee of Freemont. In 2012, Ocwen had the mortgage assigned to it in preparation for the foreclosure. Freemont, however, went out of business in 2008. Here is what Judge Butchko had to say about that: The Court takes judicial notice that on July 25, 2008, Freemont Investment and Loan (“Freemont”) entered into a voluntary liquidation and closing which did not result in a new institution. As such, the status of MERS as nominee for Freemont ended when Freemont closed on July 25, 2008, which renders the AOM created in 2012 void ab initio. [ab initio is Latin for from the first act or meaning from the start.]

This is straightforward application of the Agency rule that when the principal dies, the agency dies. MERS ceased being Freemont’s agent in 2008, when Freemont went out of business. It had no authority to act on behalf of Freemont in 2012 when the mortgage was assigned from MERS to Ocwen. There are 3 things I want you to notice in this paragraph. First, a new institution was not begun out of Freemont’s ashes. That meant that Freemont was conclusively dead. Other lenders, such as Countrywide, were purchased by other businesses. Whether the agency survived either the merger or the sale of assets is a difficult legal question, which may hinge on the details of the transaction. Second, the court took judicial notice of records kept online by the FDIC. Judicial notice is a rule of evidence that allows the court to accept evidence without a witness. You must look at the evidence code in your state to seek whether a piece of evidence is capable of being admitted by judicial notice. Third, be certain to visit the FDIC database if the original lender in your case went out of business. If, like Freemont, the lender went out of business and another business was not created from the liquidation, you may have a good argument that the lender is without question dead.

That lays the groundwork for arguing that MERS stopped being an agent when the original lender went out of business. Here is how the death of the agency played out in court: The transaction described in the AOM never legally occurred. There was never a transaction between MERS and/or Freemont Investment and Loan that sold Defendant’s loan directly to the Trust. Not in 2012, not in 2005, not ever. This is an application of the holding that the assignment was void ab initio. Something that is void ab initio has never existed legally.
PSA NOT FOLLOWED The Pooling and Servicing Agreement (PSA), like all PSAs, required the loan to go from the originator to the depositor to the trust. (If you would like some background information, read How Securitization Was Supposed To Work on the website). The note for the loan before the court, however, went from the originator directly to the trust. The AOM [assignment of mortgage] is missing a key party in the chain of ownership, the Depositor, Freemont Mortgage Securities Corporation. Similarly, the undated, specific endorsement affixed to the back of the promissory note reflects the same defective transfer from the originator to the Plaintiff, without reference to the depositor.

This endorsement is contrary to the unequivocal terms of the PSA, in evidence over Plaintiff’s objection, which required all intervening endorsements be affixed to the face of the note because there was ample room for endorsements on the face of the note. There is also no evidence the endorsement was affixed before the originator went out of business in 2008. The requirement that the loan go from the originator to the depositor to the trust serves a very important purpose, it puts the trust assets out of the reach of a bankruptcy trustee: The Court accepts the testimony of Defendant’s well qualified expert witness, Kathleen Cully, who explained the securitization model which required the protection of assets from future bankruptcy clawbacks. There could be no direct sale from the originator to the trust directly.

If you have read the post on void and voidable transactions, you know that the last sentence — there could be no direct sale from the originator to the trust directly — is very important: it means that the attempt to transfer the loan from the originator directly to the trust is void, not merely voidable. Judge Butchko also held that Ocwen lacked standing because of the failure to transfer the loan to the depositor before transferring it to the trust: Plaintiff, HSBC Bank USAS, National Association, as trustee for Freemont Home Loan Trust 2005-B mortgage Backed Certificates, Series 2005-B, failed to prove it is the proper owner and holder of the Defendant’s loan by virtue of the endorsement on the note or the assignment of mortgage. Both the endorsement and the assignment omit the Depositor, Freemont Mortgage Securities Corporation, from the transaction which constitutes a fatal break in the chain of title. 45. The Defendant presented the testimony of their expert witness, Ms. Cully, who testified that the endorsement on the note is contrary to the instructions in 2.01 of the PSA that required a complete chain of endorsements, which would include the Depositor, to be placed on the face of the note so long as space allowed. The Court notes there is ample space on the face of the note for endorsements. Therefore, the Court finds that the undated specific endorsement from the originator directly to the trust found on the back of the note is inherently untrustworthy.

The Court further questions the validity of the endorsement in that Plaintiff violated the Court’s order to produce the custodian’s records or documents showing when and how the endorsement was affixed to the original note. In addition, the Court accepts Ms. Cully’s testimony that the form of the endorsement and assignment would be grounds for the Trust to reject this loan pursuant to the PSA. There is not a complete chain of endorsements on the face of the note. The PSA required no assignment of mortgage, only that the Trust appear in the MERS system as the loan owner. For these reasons, the Court finds Plaintiff failed to prove its standing to foreclose the note and mortgage in this action.

RECORDS OF PRIOR SERVICER
Servicers incorporate the records of prior servicers in their own records. Servicers sometimes argue that the mere incorporation of the records into its system ought to allow one of its employees to testify about the things that must be proved in order to have the records admitted under the business records exception to the hearsay rule. (if you need some background on hearsay and the business record exception read Hearsay and the Prior Servicer Problem on mywebsite, mortgage-rights.com).

There are two problems with the servicer’s argument. First, its employee does not have personal knowledge of the business practices of the prior servicer. Witnesses are not allowed to testify about events for which they have no personal knowledge. You can find this rule in the Rules of Evidence. Second, to be admissible, the current servicer has to examine the records of the prior servicer to determine whether the records are accurate during the “loan boarding” process. Readers of the blog know that a close inspection of Ocwen’s loan boarding process reveals that there is no check for accuracy.

See my prior post, “Ocwen Boarding Process Fails to Check Accuracy of Prior Servicer’s Records.” Here is the testimony that Judge Butchko heard: Ms. Keeley testified the loan boarding process involved two steps. First, Ocwen confirmed that the categories for each column of financial data from the prior servicer matched or corresponded to the same name Ocwen used for that same column of financial data. Second, Ocwen confirmed the figures from the prior servicer transferred over such that the top figure from Litton became the bottom figure for Ocwen.

Ms. Keeley admitted there was absolutely no math done to check the accuracy of the prior servicer’s records or numbers. The loan boarding process’ verification to ensure the trustworthiness of the prior servicer’s records is therefore a legal fiction. In this case, Ocwen simply accepted the prior servicer’s numbers as true without any effort to audit or confirm their accuracy. The only confirmation appears to have been the check a carryover of figures from one servicer’s columns to the columns of another.

Moreover, Ms. Keeley testified loans with “red flags” would never be allowed to board onto Ocwen’s system until the prior servicer resolved them. However, Ms. Keeley also admitted she has witnessed loans that went through the boarding process that had misapplied payments and substantially incomplete loan payment histories from the prior servicer. The existence of misapplied payments and incomplete payment histories in loans that went through the loan boarding process contradicts any suggestion that the boarding process identifies red flags and/or clears them, such that Courts can trust the reliability of their records.

To support the court’s concern regarding the lack of foundation of the so called boarded records in this case, the Court takes Judicial Notice of the Consent Order entered in the matter of Ocwen Financial Corporation, Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC by the New York State Department of Financial Services dated December 22, 2014. This Consent Order documents Ocwen’s practice of backdating business records that it failed to fully resolve “more than a year after its initial discovery.” Therefore, the Court finds Plaintiff failed to inquire into the accuracy, reliability or trustworthiness of the prior servicer’s payment history. Ocwen’s own payment history merely accepts the prior servicer’s records as accurate without question unless the numbers were challenged at some point after the loan boarding process. That is simply not enough to for this court to accept the prior servicer’s records as trustworthy and admit them into evidence here. A mere reliance by a successor business on records created by others, although an important part of establishing trustworthiness, without more is insufficient. Bank of New York v. Calloway, 157 So.3d 1064, 1071 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015).

As such, this Court exercised its discretion to sustain Defendant’s objections to both payment histories as inadmissible hearsay. Therefore Plaintiff lacked evidence of an essential element of proof, damages, warranting an involuntary dismissal. “Involuntary Dismissal,” by the way, means Ocwen lost the foreclosure case… big time. Judge Butchko may sanction the Trust and/or its attorneys for fraud on the court. I would like to add another point: we may be able to use Judge Butchko’s decision to prevent Ocwen from arguing that its boarding process checks the accuracy of the prior servicer’s records. The legal term of this is “issue preclusion.” Various states may have different rules, so you need to research the issue preclusion rule in your state. In Wisconsin, parties cannot litigate issues that pass these tests: (1) whether issue preclusion can, as a matter of law, be applied, and if so, (2) whether the application of issue preclusion would be fundamentally fair. In re Estate Rille ex rel. Rille, 728 N.W.2d 693, 2007 WI 36, par. 36, 300 Wis.2d 1 (Wis., 2007). Issue preclusion can be applied as a matter of law if (1) the issue or fact was actually litigated and determined in the prior proceeding by a valid judgment in a previous action and (2) whether the determination was essential to the judgment. Judge Butchko’s opinion clearly satisfies the first requirement. She heard evidence at a trial and found that the Ocwen boarding process does not verify the accuracy of the prior servicer’s records.
THE NOTE IS NOT NEGOTIABLE
The homeowner presented a terrific expert witness at trial, who demolished Ocwen’s contention that the note is a negotiable instrument governed by Article 3 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC). Before you decide to use this argument in your foreclsoure case, please look at the caution in section “Questioning the Negotiability of the Note” on my website, mortgage-rights.com. The problems that the Negotiable Instruments law inflicts on homeowners is covered in “Botched Securitization and Dernier: Lost or Stolen Notes” on my website, mortgage-rights.com. The Court gives great weight as the trier of fact to the testimony of Defendant’s expert witness, Kathleen Cully.

Ms. Cully is a Yale Law School graduate that worked her entire career in structured finance transactions since 1985. She was extremely well versed in the Uniform Commercial Code. Among many other tasks and accomplishments, Ms. Cully testified that she led the Citigroup team that created the first pooling and servicing agreement ever. She led Citigroup’s Global Securitization strategy. The Court finds Ms. Cully eminently qualified as an expert witness in the area of securitized transactions and their interplay with the Model Uniform Commercial Code. Ms. Cully gave extensive testimony explaining that the negotiability of a promissory note is not a consideration in the securitization model. Securitization sells pools of thousands of mortgages with ever having an intention to sell each loan by individual negotiation.

Moreover, securitization routinely involves the sale of non-negotiable instruments such as car loans, rent receivables, even David Bowie’s intellectual property rights. Judge Butchko’s holding that the note was non-negotiable is based on section 3-104(1) of the UCC. Here is the statute in Wisconsin: 403.104 Negotiable instrument. (1) Except as provided in subs. (3) and (4), “negotiable instrument” means an unconditional promise or order to pay a fixed amount of money, with or without interest or other charges described in the promise or order, if all of the following apply: … (c) It does not state any other undertaking or instruction by the person promising or ordering payment to do any act in addition to the payment of money, but the promise or order may contain any of the following: 1. An undertaking or power to give, maintain or protect collateral to secure payment.

Judge Botchko analyzed whether the promise in the mortgage note was unconditional. Article 3 defines “unconditional” as: 403.106 Unconditional promise or order 1)(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, for the purposes of s. 403.104 (1), a promise or order is unconditional unless it states any of the following:

  1. An express condition to payment.
  2. That the promise or order is subject to or governed by another writing.
  3. That rights or obligations with respect to the promise or order are stated in another writing. … (b) A reference to another writing does not of itself make the promise or order conditional.

Judge Butchko found that the note was governed by the mortgage, which rendered the note non-negotiable and that the note was not for a fixed amount. . Her analysis is set out below. I suggest you read her work with a copy of your mortgage in hand.

Since notes and mortgages are fairly uniform, you may find that you have the same provisions in your mortgage, giving you a good argument that your note is non-negotiable. This Court does not address the provision [of the note] described in the Nunez opinion, instead grounding this decision on a myriad of other provisions of the Mortgage establishing the Note is subject to and governed by the Mortgage, rendering the note a non-negotiable instrument. Among other things, the additional protections routinely change the “fixed amount of money” due under the promissory note and require additional undertakings and instructions for the borrower beyond the mere repayment of money.

First, at page 2 of the mortgage, sub-section (G) expressly provides that “‘Loan’ means the debt evidenced by the Note, plus interest, any prepayment charges and late charges due under the note, and all sums due under this Security Instrument, plus interest.” (emphasis added). Paragraph 3 of the Mortgage provides for the payment of taxes and interest on the property. These payments are not described in the Note, which requires payment only of principal, interest, late fees and costs and expenses of enforcement. The Court finds the amounts due under the Mortgage are “other charges” that are not “described in” the Note, as required by 673.1041(1), Florida Statutes. That alone destroys negotiability. Furthermore, Plaintiff’s complaint seeks damages for all sums due under the Note and “such other expenses as may be permitted by the mortgage.”

Standard mortgage servicing industry practice treats all sums due under the note and mortgage as the “loan” payoff amount or the total amount needed to liquidate in full all monetary obligations arising under both the Note and the Mortgage–the Loan, as defined in the Mortgage–not just the Note. Not only does that payoff amount include charges not described in the Note, it is much more than a mere “reference” to the Mortgage “for a statement of rights with respect to collateral, prepayment or acceleration”–it means that the Note is effectively “subject to or governed by” the Mortgage, which in turn means that it is not unconditional. See Fla. Stat. 673.1061. That also destroys negotiability of the Note.

This Court finds that the Note is non-negotiable as the amounts payable under the Complaint include amounts not described in the Note and as the Note does not contain an unconditional promise to pay. The promise is not unconditional because the Note is subject to and/or governed by another writing, namely the Mortgage. Moreover, rights or obligations with respect to the Note itself–as opposed to the collateral, prepayment or acceleration–are stated in another writing, namely the Mortgage.

Moreover, the UCC definition of “holder” would necessarily include a thief that takes by forcible transfer. However, a thief would never be entitled to the equitable relief of foreclosure. Defendant correctly cites to paragraph 1 of the promissory note that expressly provides a different definition of “Note holder” from the definition of holder under Fla. Stat. 673.3011. 68. The promissory note defines the term “Note Holder” at paragraph 1 as “anyone who takes this Note by [lawful] transfer and who is entitled to receive payments under this Note.” 69. By its terms, paragraph 1 requires that any subsequent party attempting to enforce the note prove they came into possession of the note by lawful transfer and have the right to receive payments under the Note. This provision establishes the parties’ intention to contract out of the UCC definition of holder, so as to limit the right to enforce only to those who proved ownership.

The Court finds the amounts due under the mortgage are “additional protections” from possible losses that protect the Note Holder pursuant to the Uniform Secured Note provision. The protections necessarily affect the fixed amount of money due under the note. The Court further notes Plaintiff’s complaint seeks all sums due under the note and mortgage. Standard mortgage servicing industry practice treats all sums due under the note and mortgage as the “loan” payoff amount or the total amount needed to liquidate in full all monetary obligations arising under both the Note and the Mortgage. At page 4 of the mortgage, Uniform Covenant 2 entitled “Application of Payments or Proceeds” provides that “payments be applied in the following order of priority: (a) interest due under the Note; (b) principal due under the Note; and (c) amounts due under Section 3 [of this Security Instrument]. Any remaining amounts shall be applied first to late charges, second to any other amounts due under this security Instrument, and then to reduce the principal balance of the Note.” (emphasis added).

As payments are applied to amounts due under both the note and mortgage, this Court finds the Uniform Covenant 2 in the mortgage must be read as an integrated agreement with the promissory note that will necessarily change the fixed amount of money due thereunder. At the first paragraph of page 7, the mortgage provides: “Any amounts disbursed by lender under this Section 5 shall become additional debt of Borrower secured by this Security Instrument. These amounts shall bear interest at the Note rate from the date of disbursement and shall be payable, with such interest, upon notice from Lender to Borrower requesting payment.” Therefore, pursuant to the Uniform Secured Note Provision of the note and Section 5 of the mortgage, forced placed insurance premiums become additional debt secured by the mortgage bearing interest at the note rate which changes the “fixed amount of money” due. At page 8 of the mortgage are two provisions which involve rights or obligations with respect to the promise or order stated in another writing and constitute instructions and undertakings of the borrower to do acts in addition to the payment of money. At paragraph 6 of the mortgage the borrower is obligated to occupy the property as a principal residence within 60 days after signing the mortgage and must continue to occupy the property as Borrower’s principal residence for a least one year. At paragraph 7, Borrower is obligated to maintain the property and permit lender to conduct inspections, including interior inspections, upon notice stating cause for the inspection. At paragraph 8 of the mortgage, “Borrower shall be in default if” borrower gave materially false or misleading information during the loan application process or concerning Borrowers occupancy of the property as Borrower’s principal residence. At paragraph 9 of the mortgage entitled, “Protection of Lender’s Interest in the Property and Rights Under this Security Instrument” the mortgage states “any amounts disbursed by Lender under this Section 9 shall become additional debt of Borrower secured by this Security Instrument. These amounts shall bear interest at the Note rate from the date of disbursement and shall be payable, with such interest, upon notice from Lender to Borrower requesting payment.” At paragraph 14 of the mortgage entitled “Loan Charges” provides for refunds of such charges and states: “the Lender may choose to make this refund by reducing the principal owed under the Note or by making a direct payment to Borrower.” Again these additional protections for the Note Holder provided in the Uniform Secured Note provision in the note necessarily affect the “fixed amount of money” due under the note.
From: https://www . avvo . com/legal-guide s/ugc/the-latest-in-foreclosure- defense-let-hsbc-bank-v-buset-gu ide-your-arguments

 

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I welcome those reading my story. I appreciate all of the emails I have been receiving. I also appreciate those who have registered and subscribe to this blog. If you have come from Facebook please comment on this site, rather than any Facebook post of this page due to the fact that there are many readers who are not part of Facebook forums, or even Facebook itself. I encourage all readers to put their comments on this site so that all of the information will be accessible to all readers from all parts of the internet. I urge you to join this site, to receive the RSS feed, or bookmarking us, sharing us with your friends on Facebook and Twitter. If you know of anyone who might benefit from this information I urge you to pass on this website address! Share and let’s make some change together!

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Uncovering the Truth

Information can be difficult to ascertain when we are uncovering the truth.  Not only do we have facts that make up the truth, also we as a society have come to accept a level of fraud, of deception and fakery that we now call Alternative Facts.  There has developed a blatant disregard for facts and truth in much corporate media today it has made finding out “the truth” can be quite difficult.
The media has been playing with your brain.  Over the previous decades the corporate media has become obsessed and adept and controlling how and what the public thinks and feels.  The repetition of falsehoods do not make a truth.  Yet, this is what seems to be going on.  Has a complacency of a collective intelligence left a decline in desire for truth and intellect?  We must make ourselves wake from our slumber.  We must be conscious enough to read between the lines of rhetoric, emotion and alternative facts in order to find the truth inside of the information that we are being fed.
In 2008, I wrote a two part article that was an exercise in watching your own mind, emotions, and social tendencies become exposed and react as you read through.  Given the cloudiness to truth that we have in journalism today due to alternative facts, better known to most as “lies”, I thought it would be good to post this exercise again.

 

Uncovering the Truth – Part One

Is it possible that there has been a mistake? Is there a possibility that there has been some misunderstanding? Is there a possibility that our government has done something wrong?

 
This is the story of a fair skinned woman, a mother of three children, born on March 2, 1972. She comes from an upper middle-class family and spent more than 10 years studying at elite universities in the United States. Her father was a surgeon, the mother is a housewife. At one time the family lived abroad in the British city of Manchester, and in Zambia. Her brother is an architect and lives in Houston. Her sister is a neurologist and has worked at one of the best hospitals in Boston. She studied biology on a scholarship at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and earned a PhD in neuroscience at Brandeis University, where she was considered an outstanding scientist.
 
In 1992, as a sophomore at MIT, she received a Carroll L. Wilson Award for her research proposal “Islamization in Pakistan and its Effects on Women”. As a junior, she received a $1,200 fellowship through MIT’s LINKS program to help clean up Cambridge elementary school playgrounds. During her undergraduate career, she lived in McCormick Hall and worked at the MIT libraries. She graduated from MIT in 1995. In 1996, she wrote an article for the MIT Information Systems newsletter about the File Transfer Protocol and the then-emerging World Wide Web.
 
In 1999, while living in Boston, she and and her husband founded the nonprofit Institute of Research and Teaching. She went on to graduate study in Neuroscience at Brandeis University, receiving a Ph.D. degree in 2001 for her dissertation, entitled “Separating the Components of Imitation”.
 
She was active with charities and a refugee center to which she raised money for Bosnian orphans.
 
On March 1, 2003, she sent an an email to her professor, Robert Sekuler, at Brandeis University outside Boston. She was looking for a job. “I would prefer to work in the United States,” she wrote, noting that she was having difficulty finding work despite her educational background. A few days later, she disappeared. Early in the morning on the day of her disappearance, she left her parents’ house, together with her three children. She took a taxi to the airport to catch a morning flight. She was planning to visit her uncle. Two of her children are reported missing.
 
The last thing she remembers, she says, was receiving an injection in her arm. She says that when she regained consciousness she was in a prison cell, which she believes was on a military base in Afghanistan, because she heard aircraft taking off and landing. She claims that she was held in solitary confinement for more than five years, and that it was always the same Americans who interrogated her, without masks or uniforms. For days, she says, they would play tape recordings of her children’s terrified screams, and she claims that she was forced to write hundreds of pages about the construction of dirty bombs and attacks using viruses.
 
Her baby was taken away immediately, she says. They showed her a photograph of her seven-year-old, lying in a pool of blood. The only one of her children they occasionally showed her, she says, was Mariam, shown as a vague outline behind a pane of frosted glass.
 
On April 21, 2003, the NBC ran a story about her arrest on the evening news.
 
According to Human Rights Commissions, there are at least 52 secret prisons, just in the country of Pakistan, in which thousands of people are believed to have disappeared since the beginning of the war on terrorism.
 
The CIA denies that its agents had anything to do with her disappearance. Michael Scheuer, a member of a unit that pursued al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden (to which is still at large) from 1996 to 1999, says curtly: “We never arrested or imprisoned a woman. She is a liar.”
 
There were never any weapons on mass destruction. That was a lie. The Bush Administration has stated that they never tortured or wrongfully imprisoned people, to which we have found numerous untruths to this as well.
 
But if it is true that a woman was tortured and disappeared into a secret dungeon, would it be a first in the post-September 11 world — and yet another example of the decay of standards in America? Will the truth ever be uncovered?
 
 
Uncovering the Truth – Part Two
 
 
Now this time there couldn’t have been a mistake. There could be no misunderstanding on this one. Our government couldn’t have done something wrong on this one.
 
This is a story of one of the most sought after terrorists on the planet. John Ashcroft had once placed this person to the level of “the deadly seven”. Meaning one of the seven most wanted people in the world.
 
Then on a Thursday evening on July 17, 2008 in a Bazizi Mosque in Ghazni, just south of Kabul, the men were coming out of their evening prayers. They paused when they saw someone cowering on the ground. They formed a circle around the person, who was holding two small bags at their side. Fearing that this person could be carrying a bomb, one man called the police.
 
Not long after this scene, a telephone rang at the headquarters of the Federal Bureau of Intelligence (FBI) in Washington more than 11,000 kilometers away. After the call someone crossed one of “the deadly seven” names off of the suspect list and wrote the word “arrested”.
 
It took two weeks after some interrogation at the US Air Force Base in Bagram, Afghanistan before the prisoner was taken to New York. Now in a tracksuit, the now frail 90lb, 5’4″ prisoner was escorted, on August 11, 2008, into US Federal Court in Manhattan in a wheel chair. The accused had two bullet wounds in the abdomen. In October the prisoner was taken to Carswell Psychiatric Center in Fort Worth, TX for psychological review.
 
Considered a genius and hunted by the CIA and the FBI, the prisoner is believed to be a key player in raising money for al-Qaida by collecting donations and smuggling diamonds. A feather in the cap for the Bush Administration? The prisoner was considered the most important catch in five years, according to John Kiriakou, a CIA terrorist hunter.
 
This is where things can get a bit odd, though. The prisoner has not been charged with collaborating or as an accomplice in terrorist attackes. The charge was attempted murder of U.S. soldiers and FBI agents, to whom were attacked with a weapon in Afghanistan. If convicted the prisoner could face up to 20 years in prison.
 
The chief planner of the 9-11 attackes, Khlid Sheikh Mohammed, was arrested on March 1, 2003, in Rawaplindi, Pakistan. He was the biggest catch at that time in the battle against al-Qaida. The CIA interrogated him at an secret location where, it is reported he revealed aspect of the inner world of internal terrorism.
 
It is also widely known that someone being interrogated will say nearly anything in order for these interrogations to stop. It is also noted that our government used waterboarding.
 
This interrogation prompted a series of arrests not long after. The CIA felt that any name that Mohammed mentioned was immediately and automatically an important al-Quida terrorist. This one of “the deadly seven” was one of those.
 
Elaine Whitfield Sharp is an attorney for the prestigious law firm of Sharp and Sharp. On their website it states, “We are trial attorneys who represent people. Our practice is dedicated to securing justice for people in state and federal courts. We do not represent big business, the government, or insurance companies.”
 
She has represented the prisoner of this story since 2003. She is convinced that this person, who was a high-level classification prisoner and who spent five years in what is referred to as a “black site” in Bagram, the most notorious in the legal system, is being detained for political reasons and not for murder of soldiers or agents.
 
A number of other prisoners held at Bagram Air Base, the site of the most important US detainee camp in Afghanistan, say they heard a woman screaming. The woman was nicknamed the “gray lady of Bagram.”
 
She reports that the allegations brought against the prisoner thus far are “proven wrong and unsubstantiated”. The FBI and the CIA have made no comment as to these claims.
 
Sharp claimed that “every time that US authorities accused Aafia of something, we showed it was false”.
 
Sharp states, “They accuse of brokering a diamond ring for giving the proceeds to al-Quida. They said the prisoner was in Liberia when this took place. We showed the prisoner was in Boston, running a play group with a sister of the prisoner. They talked of involved in the production of neuro-chemical to be used by terrorists in the US. We showed that the accused was not.”
 
The U.S. authorities accused the prisoner of other crimes to which when Sharp asked for evidence, they never gave any.
 
There is also a media report, to which Sharp has rejected, of papers seized in Guantanamo Bay prison that state Aafia Siddiqui is married to Ali Abd al-Aziz Ali, who is an alleged al-Quida facilitator who intended to blow up gas stations or poison water reservoirs in the United States. Sharp disputes any report that she is married to this man. There has been no evidence brought forward by the government agencies to substantiate this claim.
 
Sharp states emphatically that there has been no substantiated evidence and all of this has been concocted to paint her guilty by association.
 
For your reference, these two stories are of the same person. I specifically wrote them this way so to show how your mind can go to places by simple racial, religious or terrorist phrases. When those phrase are not included, as in the first section, there might be more of a shadow of doubt and how a society might choose to react or is programmed to react a specific way to those words and phrases.
 
Either way, will her truth ever be uncovered?

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I welcome those reading my story. I appreciate all of the emails I have been receiving. I also appreciate those who have registered and subscribe to this blog. If you have come from Facebook please comment on this site, rather than any Facebook post of this page due to the fact that there are many readers who are not part of Facebook forums, or even Facebook itself. I encourage all readers to put their comments on this site so that all of the information will be accessible to all readers from all parts of the internet. I urge you to join this site, to receive the RSS feed, or bookmarking us, sharing us with your friends on Facebook and Twitter. If you know of anyone who might benefit from this information I urge you to pass on this website address! Share and let’s make some change together!

Thank you for stopping by.

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©2014-2017 Doug Boggs All Rights Reserved

What exactly is a bona fide purchaser for value?

One of the key points to my upcoming book “The Unlawful, Unlawful Detainer – a true case file study” deals with the question “what exactly is a “bona fide purchaser for value” (BPV) and every part of CA Civ . Code 2924.

The code references a Bona fide Purchaser for Value” as:
“2924.(c) A recital in the deed executed pursuant to the power of sale of compliance with all requirements of law regarding the mailing of copies of notices or the publication of a copy of the notice of default or the personal delivery of the copy of the notice of default or the posting of copies of the notice of sale or the publication of a copy thereof shall constitute prima facie evidence of compliance with these requirements and conclusive evidence thereof in favor of bona fide purchasers and encumbrancers for value and without notice.”

This language seems to imply that even if a trustee utterly failed to comply with one or more “requirements of law” above, a BPV would remain unaffected as long as the Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale states that the trustee complied. A Trustee that is owned or controlled by the bank or  a lawfirm friendly to the bank or simply to profit for themselves are able to file misrepresented statements on foreclosure documents with the County Recorder’s Office for a non-judicial foreclosure.  However, it is presumed that the borrowers might still have claims in such a case against the trustee, however, the BPV purchase would remain intact.

The courts seem to side with some seemingly nonsensical  special protections for BPV’s claims of error in the *content* of the NOD or other documents.  These can vary from a typo in the name, or the like, as long as if it would not be viewed as legally irrelevant.

In my experience in both Superior and Federal courts, the BPV’s are substantially protected against claims of error, although they don’t seem to describe the actual scope of that protection, even in general terms such as what various errors that are covered.

The courts seem to have a “favored” treatment of a BPV (relative to a beneficiary) limited to the explicit references to that concept in CC 2924.  I have not found any more general principle that is reflected in CA case law that can apply in other scenarios.

But my question is quite simple.  How can the buyer be considered a BFP under 2924)c) or the Mendez case – “without notice of any adverse interest or of any irregularity in the sale proceedings” –

I am no lawyer but the key seems to me to be the requirement that the buyer is purchasing “without notice of any adverse interest or of any irregularity in the sale proceedings”. If there is a recorded Lis Pendens on the property, the buyer is on notice. Also whether the buyer is a professional buyer could impact his ability to deny, he didn’t know since as professional in the field it could be argued by the plaintiff that the buyer as a professional should be held to a different standard when he attempts to claim he didn’t know about the Lis Pendens when he purchased the property.

I would think one could argue he was negligent if he claims he didn’t look because under the circumstances since he is in the business of buying foreclosed(step) properties he should know that he should check the records on the property before purchasing.

I would also add not to accept the judge’s ruling in an unlawful detainer action that the buyer can’t be challenged as to whether he was a BFP in an unlawful detainer action. Again I am no lawyer and am not presuming to be giving anyone legal advice, but my reading of the that section of the law saying the buyer can’t be a BFP if he didn’t purchase “without notice of any adverse interest or of any irregularity in the sale proceedings” seems to prima facie that if a judge made such a ruling in an Unlawful Detainer action, he as made an error as a matter of law and should be reversed on appeal. Hence if one gets such a ruling he should immediately appeal.

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I welcome those reading my story. I appreciate all of the emails I have been receiving. I also appreciate those who have registered and subscribe to this blog. If you have come from Facebook please comment on this site, rather than any Facebook post of this page due to the fact that there are many readers who are not part of Facebook forums, or even Facebook itself. I encourage all readers to put their comments on this site so that all of the information will be accessible to all readers from all parts of the internet. I urge you to join this site, to receive the RSS feed, or bookmarking us, sharing us with your friends on Facebook and Twitter. If you know of anyone who might benefit from this information I urge you to pass on this website address! Share and let’s make some change together!

Thank you for stopping by.

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©2014-2017 Doug Boggs All Rights Reserved